Wednesday, November 10, 2010

Austrian Economics versus the Mainstream: An Interview with Richard M. Ebeling

(The following interview will appear in Spanish in a volume entitled, Economistas Austríacos. Historias Personales e Ideas [The Austrian Economists: Personal Histories and Ideas] (Madrid: Unión Editorial, 2011), edited by Adrian Ravier, professor of economics at Universidad Francisco Marroquin in Guatemala. )


Dr. Richard Ebeling is professor of economics at Northwood University in Midland, Michigan. He was a senior fellow at the American Institute for Economic Research in Great Barrington, Massachusetts, and a visiting professor at Trinity College in Hartford, Connecticut (2008-2009). He also served as the president of the Foundation for Economic Education (FEE) in Irvington, NY (2003-2008), and has been the Ludwig von Mises Professor Economics at Hillsdale College, in Hillsdale, Michigan (1988-2003). He was vice-president of academic affairs of the Future of Freedom Foundation in Fairfax, Virginia (1990-2003). He is the author of Political Economy, Public Policy, and Monetary Economics: Ludwig von Mises and the Austrian Tradition (Routledge, 2010) and Austrian Economics and the Political Economy of Freedom (Elgar, 2003). He is the co-editor of The Dangers of Socialized Medicine (1994), The Case for Free Trade and Open Immigration (1995), The Failure of America’s Foreign Wars (1996) The Tyranny of Gun Control (1997), and Liberty, Security and the War on Terrorism (2003), all published by the Future of Freedom Foundation. He is also the editor of the three-volume work, the Selected Writings of Ludwig von Mises (Liberty Fund), based on the "lost papers" of Ludwig von Mises, which he recovered from a formerly secret KGB archive in Moscow, Russia. He is also the editor of, Money, Method and the Market Process: Essays by Ludwig von Mises (Mises Institute, 1990). In the early 1990s, he consulted on market reform and privatization with the emerging new democratic government in Lithuania when it was still part of the Soviet Union, and witnessed the violent, attempted Soviet crackdown on the Lithuanian freedom movement in January 1991. He also was with Russian defenders of freedom in Moscow during the failed hard-line coup in August 1991. Dr. Ebeling earned his PhD in economics from Middlesex University in London, England.



What was your first contact with Austrian Economics?


Dr. Ebeling: Well, in fact, it began with Ayn Rand. When I was about 16 years old, I was already very interested in public policy issues, history, and current events. But I was rather confused about the different views I would find among American liberals and conservatives.


The liberals always seemed to have the "moral high ground,” with their emphasis on "justice" and "fairness." The conservatives, on the other hand, constantly would bring things down to earth with the "bottom line" questions: Will this government policy really work? What will it cost and is it worth it? And what happens to private opportunities in the market if the government takes over this activity or heavily regulates it?


Completely by chance I happened to meet two individuals who introduced me to the writings of Ayn Rand. I first read her non-fiction books: The Virtue of Selfishness and Capitalism: the Unknown Ideal. They gave me a radically different view of man, society, and the State, which presented a philosophical and moral understanding and defence of the individual and his rights to life, liberty, and property. Here was a conception of man that was grounded in reality and ethical at the same time.


I soon read her novels, The Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged, where her entire philosophy of man and life is presented. I was living in Hollywood, California at this time. I found out that there was a taped lecture program offered about Rand’s philosophy of Objectivism not far from my home, which I started to regularly attend.


The organizers of the taped lectures sold copies of books by authors that were recommended by Ayn Rand, works there were considered to be consistent with or complementary to the ideas in her own writings. Among them were Ludwig von Mises, Henry Hazlett, Frederic Bastiat, William Graham Sumner, Herbert Spencer, and Isabel Patterson.


The books by Mises and Hazlitt were especially fascinating to me. The logic of the market place, as they explained it, suddenly made a lot of things seem intelligible when thinking about public policy and the role of government in society. From there I discovered the writings of Friedrich A. Hayek, Murray N. Rothbard, and Israel M. Kirzner. I was soon reading “backwards” to the writings of the founders of the Austrian School: Carl Menger, Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk and Friedrich von Wieser.


When I began by undergraduate studies at California University, Sacramento, I had already made up my mind to major in economics. I had a bit of a shock when I found out that most of my professors had never heard of the “Austrian School,” and what they knew about Mises or Hayek they strongly disagreed with.


In fact, virtually all my undergraduate economics professors were either Keynesians or Marxists – and Stalinist Marxists, at that. Right after Mises passed away in October of 1973, I wrote an obituary article about him for the university student newspaper. After one of my professors read the piece, he came up to me and said, “Mises? Mises? I thought he died in the 19th century!”


But the following year I had the good fortune to be invited by the Institute for Humane Studies to attend the first Austrian Economics conference held in South Royalton, Vermont in June 1974. There I had the opportunity to meet three of the leading figures of the Austrian School: Israel M. Kirzner, Ludwig M. Lachmann, and Murray N. Rothbard, whose writings have greatly influenced my thinking on both economic theory and policy, as well as the wider issues of human liberty in the free society.


During the summers of 1975 and 1977 I was a summer fellow at the Institute for Humane Studies when they were headquartered in Menlo Park, California. For most of those two summers, Friedrich A. Hayek, was also in residence at IHS. Being in Hayek’s company some part of almost every day for weeks at a time was one the most memorable events in my life, and has left a permanent imprint in my mind. He truly was one of the greatest social philosophers and political economists of the twentieth century. His patience and generosity in giving of his time and knowledge to a young and insistent student, who constantly bombarded him with questions about economic theory, classical liberalism, and the old Vienna days, will forever remain with me.


Why did you feel attracted to this approach versus the mainstream?


Dr. Ebeling: The more I read mainstream, or Neo-Classical, economics as I pursued my economics studies as a student, the more I came to realize how little this approach had to offer in terms of really understanding the nature and workings of market and social processes.


The Austrians always seemed so much more relevant, with their focus on individual human decision-making and action under conditions of imperfect knowledge, uncertainty about the future, and in an environment that is always subject to change.


This was especially the case in Hayek's work on the nature of decentralized knowledge, and the role of prices for coordinating the actions and interactions of multitudes who do not know each other but depend upon each other's specializations and abilities to improve their individual circumstances.


Mises and Hayek convinced me why socialism and interventionism were not viable economic systems in the long run, and that only a functioning, competitive market order could bring people both freedom and prosperity.


I was also deeply impressed with their monetary and business cycle analysis. It seemed so superior to the Keynesian-style aggregated, macroeconomics that I learned in my undergraduate and graduate courses in economics. The Austrians offered a truly "micro" foundational basis to understanding economy-wide fluctuations in employment, output and prices. And one that showed how these processes worked out through time.


As Joseph Schumpeter (who though trained by the Austrians in old Vienna did not consider himself an "Austrian") said, by focusing on these microeconomic process aspects for understanding macroeconomic events, the Austrian approach may be less simple than the Keynesian alternative, but it is far richer in results.


As the same time, I found fascinating how the Austrians took up Adam Smith's idea of the "invisible hand" and applied it to demonstrate the origin and evolution of social and market institutions that are often the unintended consequences of human action. This reinforced the argument against those who arrogantly wished to socially engineer human society. There is far more knowledge and experience at work in social processes, over years and over generations of people, than any planners could ever master and successfully manipulate to any good end.


How do the Austrian Economists see the Chicago School of Economics? Are they friends or foes?


Dr. Ebeling: The primary difference between the Austrian and Chicago Schools of Economic Thought concern questions of methodology, that is, how does one do economics as a science?


The modern Chicago School's methodology is a variation on positivism, that is, the idea that to be a "real" science, economics needs to construct hypotheses that are open to experimental falsification along the model of physics. This requires that the subject matter of economics be reducible to purely measurable and quantifiable data.


The problem is that economics, while certainly including elements that have a measurable dimension – prices, output, quantities bought and sold – is the study of human action and its intended and unintended consequences. This means that economics at its most fundamental level must begin with an appreciation of and an insight into the meaning of purposeful conduct. All that happens in the social arena begins with the meanings and intentions of individuals, with those meanings and intentions providing the context and interpretive basis for understanding why men act, the logic of their conduct, and then analyzing what happens when those individuals act and interact in the market.


In other words, the following questions cannot be answered unless you begin with the actor's subjective point-of-view: What is a consumption good and what is an investment or capital good? What is a "means" and what is an "end"? What is the "cost" of an action, and what might be its "benefit"? What is a "substitute" good, and what is a "complementary" good? What is "supply" and what is "demand"? What is a "market" and of what type? What is a "scarce" good and what is a "free" good?


These cannot be understood, defined, or analyzed independent of understanding how actors in particular circumstances, with particular purposes in mind, define and assign meanings to these ideas and relate these concepts to each other.


Economists often speak of unintended versus intended consequences that may arise from individual actions, or from the interactions of several individuals. But how do we even know what to understand as an "intended" outcome from an "unintended" outcome, separate from the purposes, goals and intentions of the actors' themselves?


None of these exist "objectively," that is, they do not exist in the physical world independently of their existence in the minds of men.


This, in my view, is one of the most fundamental differences in approach and analysis that separates the Austrians from the members of the Chicago School, in general. Your method of analysis influences much of what you look for in economics, what you see, and how you go about the seeing.


Now, the other aspect of your question concerns the political or policy orientation of Austrian vs. Chicago economists. In general, Chicago and Austrians traditionally have been pro-free market. And there are many Austrian and Chicago economists who have been strongly classical liberal or even libertarian.


But it is true that Austrians have tended to be more radically classical liberal or libertarian in many of their views of society, government, and public policy. Obviously, to fully answer this you would have to look at the biography of each individual to understand how they came to their views on political philosophy, public policy, and the role of government in society.


However, having said that, I believe that part of the reason is that the Austrian approach often reinforces an appreciation for how the market process has the capacity to integrate and coordinate far more knowledge and activities among the multitude of market participants than government would ever have the ability to do. Thus, Austrians tend to be far more suspicious that government can "fix" any supposed "social problem." They have far more confidence that leaving these problems to sort themselves out through the market and other related voluntary associations will be far more effective than a coercive “one-size-fits-all” approach of government involvement.


James M. Buchanan has explained in an interview that he did for the Mises Institute that he would consider himself an Austrian, and that Mises and Hayek, would accept that. Do you consider Buchanan an Austrian thinker? Is the Public Choice totally consistent with the Austrian tradition?


Dr. Ebeling: James Buchanan studied with Frank Knight at the University of Chicago. It is well known that Knight was a leading critic of "Austrian" capital theory, that he did not agree with Mises or Hayek about the impossibility of economic calculation under socialism, and that he was very far from being an advocate of laissez-faire.


But Knight, at the same time, was a strong and sometimes eloquent opponent of Positivism and Bahaviorism. Many of his methodological essays from the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s, present arguments against Positivism that are very similar to those made by Mises and Hayek. Knight believed that economics could not be moulded along the lines of the natural sciences, and therefore could not limit itself to the methods of, say, physics. And he believed there are limits to the application of mathematics in economics.


He emphasized the importance of introspection as a source of knowledge in the study of human action and choice. He argued that one could not ignore the "subjectivist" elements to social and economic processes. Like Mises, Knight had been very influenced by the German sociologist and historian, Max Weber, in focusing on human action as "intentional conduct" to which the actor assigns subjective meanings.


Unlike Milton Friedman or George Stigler (who also studied or interacted with Frank Knight at the University of Chicago), James Buchanan absorbed many of Knight's views and ideas on methodological subjectivism. This is seen most clearly in Buchanan’s short, but excellent, book, Cost and Choice. Here he presents a conception of the meaning and logic of cost that runs parallel to much of the Austrian analysis.


As for Public Choice, many of the useful insights of the application of economic thinking to the political process were understood by some of the Classical Economists of the 19th century, and by some of the early "Marginalist" economists of the late 19th and early 20th century. For example, the analysis of the bias towards government intervention in the political process due to the concentration of government-bestowed benefits for special interest groups and the diffusion of the costs or burdens of these interventions among the vast majority of the taxpaying and consumer public, was understood in a fairly clear way by Jean-Baptiste Say and Nassau Senior.


The logic behind this aspect of State interventionism was developed very clearly by the famous Italian economist, Vilfredo Pareto, in the 1890s. And the reasons for this bias toward particular producer interests at the expense of general consumer interests, is explained by Philip Wicksteed in his Common Sense of Political Economy (1910). Wicksteed, of course, was greatly influenced by the early Austrians (Menger, Boehm-Bawerk, Wieser) and, in turn, he was one of the influences on the post-World War I generation of Austrians in Vienna.


Finally, the logic of the concentration of special-interest benefits and the diffusion of their burden on the rest of the society was analyzed by the Austrian economist, Oskar Morgenstern, in his 1937 book, The Limits of Economics. The relevant chapter has been reprinted in, Richard M. Ebeling, editor, Austrian Economics: A Reader (Hillsdale College Press, 1990). Morgenstern extends the analysis with an "Austrian" twist by developing the theory in the context of a time-sequential process.


Unfortunately, much of contemporary Public Choice theory has been moulded by the dominant mainstream, Neo-classical mathematical approach. Even Buchanan has several times critically commented on the fact that due to this much of Public Choice theory has moved in a wrong and unrealistic direction, that it has lost its grounding in a common sense, market process framework.


The Austrians, since the time of Carl Menger, have insisted that the complex phenomena of the market can only be successfully understood and analyzed by first reducing it to its elemental components, i.e., the individual acting men, and explaining the logic of human choice and activity under the inescapable conditions of scarcity, uncertainly, and the passage of time. Only then can the analyst proceed to explain the emergence of the complex social and economic order that arises out of the interactions of those acting and choose individuals. This also includes the analysis of those unintended social and market institutional forms and relationships that are the results of human action, but not of human design.


Buchanan has argued that it is sufficient to start the analysis on the basis of interpersonal exchange and the processes that emerge out of these mutual gains from trade. Thus, he has tended to place less importance on grounding economic theory on a prior and methodical study of individual man, as the Austrians have insisted upon.


Thus, much of Buchanan's writings are consistent with certain parts of the body of Austrian theory. For the most part his ideas run parallel in certain ways to Austrian Economics, but they are not the same. Nonetheless, Austrians have much to learn from and appreciate in James Buchanan's contributions to economics. Indeed, I would say that Buchanan's contributions are among the most important in economics since the Second World War. Especially insightful has been his emphasis on what he has called, "Constitutional Political Economy." That is, the study and analysis of the alternative social and political institutional orders in which human beings may interact, for understanding which of these orders are likely to be most conducive to fostering freedom, prosperity, and peaceful harmony for mankind in the long run. This focus, I might add, is most certainly a valuable complement to the type of analysis that Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich A. Hayek developed in their institutional comparisons of market economies vs. socialist planning systems vs. interventionist-welfare states.


Let´s talk about John Maynard Keynes. Do we have to rescue any insight in his philosophy? I have in mind Axel Leijonhufvud book, “On Keynesian Economics and the Economics of Keynes."


Dr. Ebeling: Interpreting the “real” message in and meaning of Keynes’ 1936 book, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, has become an entire “research industry” in the economics profession. In other words, “Will the real John Maynard Keynes please stand up?”


Leijonhufvud’s 1968 book, which you mention, was one of the significant attempts to try to make sense of Keynes’ macroeconomics by attempting to explain it in terms of microeconomic foundations. His work and that of his colleague, Robert Clower, were insightful and creative attempts to do so. And there are still many valuable things to learn from their works, separate from their efforts to “save” Keynes.


But having said that, my reading of The General Theory several times, as well as many of the interpretive analyses over the years, still leaves me persuaded that Keynes’ work remains confused and contradictory to our essential understanding of human decision-making and the workings of markets.


The fundamental flaw in Keynes’ approach remains the one that F. A. Hayek pointed out when he reviewed Keynes’ earlier work, A Treatise on Money in the early 1930s. That flaw is Keynes’ attempt to construct a theory of the “economy as a whole” on the basis of aggregates and averages.


Such an approach hides from view all the microeconomic relationships and interconnections between the structures of relative prices and wages, and the different sectors of the market that are the setting in which the market process occurs and is played out. First of all, and contrary to most Keynesian reasoning, there is no such thing as “aggregate demand,” and therefore there is no such thing as a “failure” of aggregate demand.


There is the demand for shoes, and hats, and bananas, and houses, and . . .


But there is no such thing as a demand for "output as a whole." After all, there is no such "demander" in the market place Thus, we must ask why there can arise mismatches, imbalances, disequilibrium between a variety of individual market demands and supplies, which, it is true, can feed on each other, with microeconomic distortions interacting on each other and bringing about a cumulative decline in employments, productions, and outputs.


The "Austrians" see the cause of the depression or recession as usually arising from monetary mismanagement that has distorted essential market price signals -- in this case, market rates of interest -- that generate over time imbalances between savings and investment, and a misallocation of labor, capital and other resources among the sectors of the economy.


It is these imbalances in the demands and supplies, and resulting distortions in the structure of relative prices and wages, that eventually set the stage at some point for a necessary correction in the market.


But when the "boom" has ended there is no escaping the necessary realignments in the structure of relative prices and wages; reallocations of capital and labor to reflect the post-boom patterns of supplies and demands, and the writing down or writing off of various investment projects begun during the boom period, and found now to be unprofitable in the post-boom correction period.


If there are superimposed on this correction process inflexible or "rigid" prices and wages that resist or significantly lag behind the necessary realignment in the price-wage structure and supply-demand adjustments, then there will be additional unemployment and reduced production in various sectors. And these will then put greater downward pressure on other individual demands and supplies, no doubt.


But what is crucial is not that there is that some imagined "aggregate demand" deficiency. Rather, the problems are on the supply-side, in the failure or resistance or delays in the appropriate price and wage and resource allocation adjustments.


This would be understood more easily and clearly, it seems to me, if presumed "macro"-economic problems were looked at more often and consistently through a microeconomic chain of logic. It would make the policy issues and answers seem different, as well. They would point more in the direction suggested by Friedrich Hayek in the 1930s and the decades that followed.


It also means that whatever other criticism may be raised against deficit spending and growing debt burdens, this more "Austrian"-type micro analysis enables us to see that government stimulus or stimulated "aggregate demand" spending is not spending on "output as a whole," because as I suggested, there is no such demand.


The government's spending or the spending induced by government fiscal "activism" are always, by micro necessity, demands for particular goods or services in particular sectors or corners of the market. And their sustainability is limited to how long government continues to spend or stimulate spending in particular ways and in a particular direction.


If or when that "stimulus" spending is slowed down or ended, the patterns of demands and the structure of prices dependent on it, and the resource and labor employments derived from it, must decline. And a new layer of necessary adjustments and realignments are now required in the economy.


That is, such "demand management" activity runs the risk of setting the stage for a future downturn as a result of the ways the government had earlier tried to move the economy out of the recession.


Thus, the Austrian argument is not an argument of resignation or despair or insensitivity to the hardships of those unemployed in the downturn. Rather, it is a positive conception of what is needed to be allowed to work within the market, itself, so that rebalance and re-coordination can come about for real and sustainable recovery without making a future downturn inevitable.


This book is publishing an interview you did with Fritz Machlup in 1980, where you asked “how did the Austrians distinguish their own economics from others in the 1920s”. Machlup gave you his own list. One, methodological individualism. Two, methodological subjectivism. Three, marginalism. Four, individual tastes and preferences. Five, opportunity costs. Six, the time structure of consumption and production.” Has this list changed today?


In many ways, the same list applies to day as when I did that interview with Fritz Machlup back in 1980. But I would suggest that it might be slightly modified in terms of ideas and emphasis.


Let’s go over some on this list. Methodological individualism refers to the idea that all social and market analysis should start with the actions and interactions of individuals. The Austrians (and other social theorists) emphasize that all language and references to such things as the “people,” the “nation,” the “group,” the “society,” the “market,” or the “community,” are merely short-hands for the interactive associations of individuals. The “people” never act; the “nation” never decides; the “society” never chooses. These do not exist independently of the individuals making up such groups. To assign existence to them is to commit the fallacy of conceptual realism; that is, to presume or assign autonomous existence to a concept or construct of the mind. Hence, all tastes and preferences are individual and personal, as well. There are no “community” or “social” preferences, or utility or welfare functions.


Methodological subjectivism emphasizes that in the social world, we can only understand and interpret people’s actions in terms of the meanings they assign to their own activities in relations to others and the objects of the world. The physical world is filled with objectively existing objects. But what they are in the arena of human activity, how they are used and for what purpose can only be understood in the context of the intentions and meanings of the human actors. This, alone, makes the nature of the social sciences, including economics, uniquely distinct from the subject matter of the natural sciences.


Marginalism has a distinct meaning in the Austrian framework. Traditionally, in mainstream, or Neo-Classical, economics, marginalism has been viewed as a mathematical function, that is, the rate of change in the amount of utility received from the consumption of a good. Beginning with Pareto there has been an attempt in Neo-Classical microeconomics to do away with the presumption of “utility” as being a measurable quantity, and to speak of more, or less, or equally “preferred.” But this is all a sleight-of-hand, since the construction and differentiation of the functions reflecting total or marginal “preferredness,” as in the indifference curve approach, merely changes the names while continuing the same quantitative calculations of comparison.


The Austrians, from the time of Menger, have viewed the weighing of choices and the making of trade-offs in terms of ordinal rankings of discrete alternatives. The focus has been on “margins of use” and not amounts or degrees of satisfaction or utility.


Opportunity Cost refers to the next best alternative foregone in an act of choice. From the Austrian perspective, only individuals make choices and, hence, cost is always personal and “subjective.” Since choices only relate to possibilities that the individual still views as open to him in the future (whether that future is a moment from now or a month from now), the opportunities are those the individual imagines in his mind, as he sees and evaluates them.


Thus, there are no and cannot be any such thing as “social costs.” Costs can only be known and born by the individual making choices. The actions of others can only modify the social environment in which any particular individual now has to decide what he views as the options open to him and the relative significance they have for him.


We would not say, for instance, that nature has imposed a “cost” on a person because during a storm a tree fell across a road, which that individual will have to take the time and effort to move out of the way if he wishes to travel on that road. A natural event will have changed the environment in which that individual has to, now, decide what is the best course of action for him to follow.


If someone had cut down the tree that has now fallen across the road, he may or may not have cut it down with the purpose of making that other individual’s travel plans more difficult. But it remains the fact that he has changed the setting in which that other individual now has to act. But the “cost” remains an evaluative judgement in that other individual’s mind; it is not something objectively imposed on him by the woodchopper. This is a subtle point. But it is one that is important not to lose sight of.


Machlup’s emphasis on the time structure of consumption and production remains as relevant as a distinct element in Austrian theory today as when he suggested this list. And as my earlier comment on the shortcomings of Keynesian economics brought out, these relationships between the time patterns of consumption, savings and investment are crucial for understanding the interconnections in such things as the business cycle.


What I find interesting, looking over Machlup’s list of distinct aspects of the Austrian perspective, is the absence of any reference to “unintended consequences” and “spontaneous order.” Since Menger’s writings in the 1870s and 1880s, a particular “Austrian” emphasis compared to most of Neo-Classical economics, has been an analysis of institutions and their evolution and development independent of conscious social or political design.


Indeed, this is often considered one of the hallmarks of the Austrian method and approach. And, yet, it was ignored by Fritz Machlup, one of the most careful and knowledgeable members of the interwar Austrian generation, and a very close friend of Hayek’s who made the study of spontaneous order a central aspect of much of his own social theory.


There is a debate between the Austrian economists of the Mises Institute and those of George Mason University, about what we call today “Austrian Economics”. At the beginning of this year, we see a post by Peter Boettke where he explained why they decide to change the title of the blog from “Austrian economics” to “Coordination problem”. Are we seeing a division within the Austrian School?


We need to keep in mind that there never was a uniform Austrian School of Economics. While Menger’s writings were the beginning of the Austrian School, there emerged differences of emphasis and approach between him and his two leading early followers, Böhm-Bawerk and Friedrich von Wieser. This continued in the interwar period of the 1920s and 1930s. And it continues, today.


Rather than be dismayed or concerned about “divisions” within the Austrian School, it is really a sign of vibrant growth and innovation, as different individuals see possibilities and avenues for research and development within those generally shared ideas that make up the starting points of the Austrian approach.


Let’s return to your own work. Can you give us some background on your two books, Austrian Economics and the Political Economy of Freedom, and Political Economy, Public Policy, and Monetary Economics: Ludwig von Mises and the Austrian Tradition?


Dr. Ebeling: Austrian Economics and the Political Economy of Freedom was published by Edward Elgar in 2003. I try to explain the core concepts of the Austrian School, how they differ from other schools of economic thought, and the nature of both socialism and the interventionist-welfare state from an Austrian Economic and classical liberal perspective.


My more recent volume was published in early 2010, entitled Political Economy, Public Policy, and Monetary Economics: Ludwig von Mises and the Austrian Tradition, by Routledge. The beginning chapters discuss the ideas and contributions of Ludwig von Mises in the historical context in which he lived and wrote, especially in the first half of the 20th century.


In a lengthy chapter I explain the Austrian theory of money and the business cycle and the Austrian analysis of the causes of and the cures for the Great Depression of the 1930s; and I then offer a detailed critical study of the Keynesian alternative that was in competition with the Austrian view at that time. In two other chapters I compare Mises' theory of money and business cycles with that of Joseph Schumpeter, and then Mises and Hayek in relation to the Swedish Economists. I also present in the concluding chapter the distinctly "Austrian" theory of expectations and expectations-formation for understanding the problems of market coordination in a complex and ever-changing economy.


You've travelled a good deal. What is the status of freedom in the world these days?


Dr. Ebeling: To use the famous line with which Charles Dickens began A Tale of Two Cities, "It was the best of times, and the worst of times." On the one hand, all the totalitarian systems of the 20th century - fascism, Nazism, communism - are gone. We have seen the dismantling of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union. There are very few who will, with a straight face, still publically advocate Soviet-style central planning.


Many countries around the world that suffered from poverty and lived under socialist tyranny are now experiencing economic growth and prosperity. They have abandoned the ‘socialist road" and have introduced, if not a free market, then at least freer market reforms. These changes have generated rising standards of living in parts of the world that have only known hunger and despair for all of recorded history.


But what has not been defeated is the socialist critique of capitalism. That is, many people, and most especially educators, those in the mass media and the political arena, believe the socialist claims that capitalism, as an economic system, is inherently bad. It results in exploitation of consumers and workers; it doesn't produce the goods and services that people "really" need; it is short-sighted and harms the environment; and it causes the boom and busts of the business cycle, resulting in innocent, ordinary people losing their jobs.


Thus, all current economic policies, and especially during this recession, are grounded in the idea that free markets have failed and only "big government" can save the economy and society. Now, of course, what we are actually suffering from is the failure of the interventionist state and misguided monetary policies that have gotten us into this mess. But, unfortunately, that is not how things are seen by most of those who mould public opinion and set government policy.


Give us a little background on how you discovered the lost papers of Ludwig von Mises in a formerly secret Soviet archive in Moscow.


Dr. Ebeling: In 1934, Mises had accepted a teaching post at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. But he sublet a room in the Vienna apartment that he had lived in since the beginning of the 20th century. In March 1938, shortly after the Nazi Germany's annexation of Austria, the Gestapo ransacked Mises' apartment and carted off his library, personal and family papers, his professional writings, and correspondence.


For the remainder of his life, Mises believed that the Nazis had destroyed all of his looted property. In fact, they were warehoused in German-occupied Czechoslovakia along with many other collections of papers and documents that the Nazis plundered in the various parts of Europe they conquered. At the end of the war, the Soviets captured this vast cache of papers and documents, and under Stalin's orders they were hidden away in a secret archive in Moscow built for this purpose.


My wife, Anna, and I were in Vienna in 1993 doing archival research about Ludwig von Mises and other Austrian Economists. A friend of mine told us that some German diplomats had recently been in Moscow looking for information about anti-fascist Germans from the interwar period of the 1930s. While going through various records they saw a reference to Ludwig von Mises, but because he was Austrian and not German, they had not followed up on it. And that was all my friend knew.


In 1996, my wife and I went to the Holocaust Museum in Washington, D.C. and one of the researchers there showed us the index to a formerly secret KGB archive in Moscow that was now open to Russian and foreign scholars. Going through the index we came across an entry, "Ludwig Mises - Fund 623." Nothing else.


When we returned to Hillsdale, I informed George Roche, the college president, what we had found. He immediately arranged for the financing of a trip to Moscow so my wife and I could follow this lead. Anna was born and raised in Moscow, and with the assistance of some of her friends we were able to gain access to the archive and Mises' papers. We returned to the United States with over 8,000 pages of photocopied material, nearly the entire collection of papers and documents, the originals of which still are kept in that archive in Moscow.


Are they fully published now? Can you assess their impact?


Dr. Ebeling: Liberty Fund of Indianapolis has been supporting the translation and publishing of a large portion of these papers. Two of three volumes have so far appeared in print under my editorship, under the title, Selected Writings of Ludwig von Mises. The last of the three volumes will appear in early 2011.


Those who are a bit familiar with Ludwig von Mises' writings easily might think of him as the great economic theorist, focusing on the wide issues of capitalism vs. socialism vs. the interventionist state; or as a monetary theorist explaining the nature of money and the causes of the business cycle. But in the Austria of his time, especially both before the First World War and in the interwar period of the 1920s and 1930s, Mises earned his living as a nuts and bolts economic policy analyst as a senior staff member at the Vienna Chamber of Commerce.


Many of these "lost papers" show him as grappling with the reality of a hyperinflation in the immediate aftermath of the First World War; devising policy strategies to overcome the fiscal madness of massive deficit spending by left-leaning Austrian governments; and proposing policies for Austria to overcome the disastrous consequences of misguided economic policy during the Great Depression. In these papers you see how Mises combines theory with practice in dealing with a tidal wave of government interventionism and socialist planning.


We are coming to the end. Why do you think Austrian tradition is still out of the study programs of a degree in economics? Is it possible to change this tendency?


Dr. Ebeling: The Austrian School went into decline in the 1940s and 1950s due to the triumph of Keynesian Economics and the dominance of mathematical general equilibrium theory in microeconomics. The current economic crisis should be a lesson, again, that it is government monetary and fiscal policy that is the cause of market instability and economy-wide imbalances and distortions. And the failure of the recent “stimulus” policies to get out of the recession phase of the business cycle should be seen, once more, as demonstrating the fundamental errors in Keynesian thinking.


The hyper-mathematical, general equilibrium approach to market analysis that lead too many economists to presume that markets were always and everywhere perfectly in balance and fully adjusted to all “relevant data” in the economy should throw into doubt some of the foundations of mainstream Neo-Classical economics.


But it remains to be seen if any of these ideas in both macroeconomics and microeconomics, in fact, get rejected or at least rethought. So in spite of the fact that I think that Austrian Economics is a better and more insightful way to look at the market and its workings, I’m not especially optimistic that the Austrian approach will be widely accepted in the near future.


What do you think about the future of Austrian Economics?


Dr. Ebeling: While I am not confident that Austrian Economics will become the dominant approach in the economics profession any time soon, I am optimistic about work within the Austrian tradition that will keep it a vibrant and “progressive research program.”


Important work continues to be done by Austrians in analyzing monetary and banking institutions, and the business cycle. There have been and are significant advancements in the Austrian theories of entrepreneurship, the firm, and the market order, in general. Austrians are expanding their research and studies into the nature and evolutionary processes of institutions and social orders.


All this, and more, makes it certain that there will be a unique and knowledge-advancing Austrian School and approach well into the 21st century.


Thank you so much for sharing your views with us

Monday, November 8, 2010

A Return to the Gold Standard? by Richard M. Ebeling

Over the weekend of November 6-7, 2010, World Bank president, Robert Zoellick , proposed in a column written for the Financial Times that the global economy once more be linked to gold as an anchor to help maintain currency stability and reduce inflationary expectations in international markets.


A few days earlier, on November 1, Financial Times columnist, Martin Wolf, had written a piece precisely asking, “Could the World Go Back to a the Gold Standard?” Wolf pointed out, “It is not hard to understand the attractions of a gold standard. Money is a social convention. The advantage of a link to gold (or some other commodity) is that the value of money would apparently be free from manipulation by the government. The aim, then, would be to ‘de-politicize’ money.”


But Wolf raised a number of objections to reestablishing a gold standard, including, (a) the fact that it would require a significant revision upwards in the official price of gold in terms of dollars, which seemed unfair to him since it would give an unearned windfall to current holders of gold; (b) it would impose additional transactions costs in international dealings since some trade imbalances would have to be settled through transfers of gold; and (c) it might inhibit necessary flexibility in the banking and financial system for the monetary authority to counteract recessionary forces that may lead to falling production and rising unemployment.


As Martin Wolf correctly observed, historically a primary advantage of a gold standard was that it removed the hand of the government from the handle of the monetary printing press. Over and over again, governments have used their power or influence over the monetary system to either debase coins or print up paper money to cover its expenditures in excess of the taxes collected from the citizenry.


But in spite of Wolf’s concerns, it can be argued the costs of a gold standard are far less that the costs that have been imposed on society from a century of gross mismanagement of the monetary system by governments around the world. Since 1914, when the Federal Reserve System came into operation as America’s central bank, and the beginning of the First World War that same year, the world has experienced severe inflations, including a number of hyperinflations, and the rollercoaster of several booms and recessions, including the Great Depression of the 1930s and the current global economic downturn.


Placing the fate of the world’s monetary system in the hands of monetary central planners, who have had all the discretion imaginable through their control of paper money instead of gold, has not secured an inflation- or recession-free economic environment.


In the mid-1980s, leading free market economist, Milton Friedman, who for decades had advocated a paper money monetary system restricted to increasing the money supply within a narrow “rule” of three percent a year, admitted that he had been all wrong in believing that such a system could ever work. He said that he, now, realized that it would never be in the interest of governments or their central banks to resist the temptation of printing money to cover government spending, serve special interest groups, and advance other short-run political purposes. He concluded that, in retrospect, the costs on society since 1914 from inflations and the boom and bust cycle caused by central bank mismanagement were far greater than the costs that would have been associated with a real, politically-free gold standard from mining, minting and storing gold, and facilitating transactions through use of the yellow metal during the 20th century.[i]


The fact is, government-caused inflations, and fears of inflation, have already delivered a windfall gain to all those astute and entrepreneurial enough to investment in gold or gold-mining companies over the years. They have protected their wealth and assets from dollar depreciation and sometimes earned handsome returns from their holding of gold. But it was government monetary mismanagement that created this “opportunity.”


If the Federal Reserve were to stop increasing the money supply, and if a new legal redemption rate between gold and dollars were to be established on the basis of the estimated total number of dollars in circulation in the world divided by the amount of gold held by the U.S. government, any financial “gains” made by the holders of gold would be all due to the avalanche of dollars that have been printed up by the Federal Reserve over the decades. Gold’s dollar appreciate in value has been due to the dollar's depreciation caused by unlimited monetary expansion.


Finally, Wolf’s concern that a real gold standard would tie the hands of governments and central banks from having the discretionary authority to manipulate the monetary system should be considered a “plus,” not a minus. Only the most doctrinaire Keynesian can deny or fail to see that past recessions and the current economic downturn were all preceded by unsustainable booms resulting from monetary expansions and interest rate manipulations that threw savings and investment out of balance, artificially stimulated misplaced construction projects, and misdirected labor into employments that became unprofitable to maintain once the inevitable financial and investment bubbles burst.[ii]


Monetary-induced booms are the “cause” that precedes the inescapable bust that follows. Eliminate or radically reduce the possibility for central banks and governments from artificially creating such booms, and the likelihood of having to go through economy-wide downturns will have been dramatically reduced or done away with.


At one point in his article, Martin Wolf mentions that some have called for an even more radical monetary reform than even a government-managed new gold standard: the abolition of central banking and a full separation of money from the state, through a monetary system based on competitive, private free banking.


Wolf sets that alternative aside as well, thinking that the world is certainly not ready for such a change, even if it was workable. But, in fact, this is the ultimate and most reasonable of all the alternatives to the existing system of monetary central planning through the government institution of central banks.


Monetary central planning has worked no better than any other form of central planning over the last one hundred years. The world’s central bankers – just like the central planners in the old Soviet Union – just do not have the knowledge, wisdom and ability to successful manage the monetary system of a market economy.


How can central bankers know what market rates of interest should be, better than the competitive interaction of borrowers and lenders for the use of scarce savings for various investment purposes? How can central bankers know what the quantity and types of money and credit should be in the market, better than those who wish to use various commodities for money purposes, and interact for various forms of lending and borrowing?


Money emerged out of market interactions, through people’s search for ways to better facilitate their transactions. Governments did not create money; but governments have been highly creative in devising ways to monopolize its control over money, and manipulate its quantity and value for political purposes.


Banking and other forms of financial intermediation do not require government creation or oversight to function effectively to bring lenders and borrowers together for mutual advantageous exchanges. But government regulations and controls imposed on financial markets can generate anti-competitive practices; can result in distorted and misdirected uses of savings and capital; and can enable the wasteful siphoning off of a part of society’s scarce resources to fund the insatiable appetite of government for spending other people’s money.


Luckily, over the last twenty years, a number of free market economists have successfully demonstrated how a private, competitive free banking system can operate, and perform far better a variety of tasks and activities for which it has been presumed a central bank was needed.[iii]


The time has come to rethink the basic premises of the existing monetary order. And this needs to begin with thinking "outside the box" of the predominant macroeconomic policy framework.


The wisdom and insights of the classical economists must be given a new hearing, in terms of their argument in support of a market-based commodity monetary system, such as a gold standard.


Even more radically, we need to rethink the rationale for central banking all together. We need, in the phrase of Austrian economist, F. A. Hayek, to consider the "denationalization of money," and a monetary order based on private, competitive free banking.

The return to a market-based money such as gold, therefore, is both possible and desirable. And it would be most effective in acting as a barrier against any further government abuses of the monetary system, if such a return to gold was introduced through the freeing of banking and financial markets from the heavy-hand of government, as well.


The next phase of our post-communist world may very well require the end to monetary socialism, which is what central banking really represents.



[i] Milton Friedman, “Economists and Economic Policy,” Economic Inquiry (Jan. 1986), pp. 1-10; “The Resource Cost of Irredeemable Paper Money,” Journal of Political Economy (June 1986), pp. 642-64-7; and, “Has Government Any Role in Money?” Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 17 (1986) pp. 37-62.

[ii] See, Richard M. Ebeling, “Market Interest Rates Need to Tell the Truth, or Why Federal Reserve Policy Tells Lies,” in Richard M. Ebeling, Timothy Nash, and Keith A. Pretty, eds., In Defense of Capitalism (Midland, MI: Northwood University Press, 2010) pp. 57-60; and Richard M. Ebeling, Political Economy, Public Policy, and Monetary Economics: Ludwig von Mises and the Austrian Tradition (London/New York: Routledge, 2010), Ch. 7: “The Austrian Economists and the Keynesian Revolution: The Great Depression and the Economics of the Short-Run,” pp. 203-272.

[iii] Kevin Dowd, Private Money: The Path to Monetary Stability (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1988); and, The State and the Monetary System (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989); George Selgin, Theory of Free Banking: Money Supply Under Competitive Note Issue (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1988); and, Banking Deregulation and Monetary Order (New York: Routledge, 1993); Lawrence H. White, Free Banking in Great Britain: Theory, Experience, and Debate, 1800-1845 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Competition and Currency: Essays on Free Banking and Money (New York: New York University Press, 1989); and, Theory of Monetary Institutions (New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 1999).

Thursday, August 5, 2010

A Leader for Liberty in Latin America: Manuel Ayau (1925-2010) by Richard M. Ebeling

One of the outstanding leaders of individual liberty and economic freedom in Latin America, Dr. Manuel Ayau, passed away on August 4, 2010 at the age of 85.

Many Americans may not be familiar with his name or his contributions to the cause of liberty, but he was most assuredly one of the “movers and shakers” in defense of capitalism in the Spanish-speaking world.

His greatest and most lasting achievement was the founding in 1972 of Francisco Marroquin University (FMU) in Guatemala. He also served as its first president until 1988. Under his stewardship, FMU has developed into one of the most academically respected institutions of higher learning in Central and South America, not only offering undergraduate degrees but graduate programs in medicine and dentistry, as well.

But the true hallmark of FMU since its establishment by Manuel Ayau is its principled and uncompromising dedication to the ideals of classical liberalism and free market economics, and especially that free market tradition known as the “Austrian School” of economics. Indeed, no student can successfully graduate from Francisco Marroquin University without taking two mandatory courses: “The Social Philosophy of Ludwig von Mises” and “The Social Philosophy of F. A. Hayek,” the two leading figures of the Austrian School in the 20th century.

His courage in establishing FMU was not only due to the obvious entrepreneurial and financial risk in founding a private institution of higher learning. It was courageous because in the 1970s Guatemala was in the midst of a violent civil war, with collectivist and socialist fractions of several types battling and committing acts of terror against “enemies of the revolution.” His life was threatened more than once because of his public voice in support of the classical liberal ideals of constitutionally limited government, rule of law, private property, and freedom of enterprise -- and his building of Francisco Marroquin University.

Born on December 27, 1925, Dr. Ayau earned a B.A. degree in Mechanical Engineering from Louisiana State University in 1950, and was awarded two honorary doctoral degrees, one in Law from Hillsdale College in 1973, and one in Literature from Northwood University in 1994.

In the world of business Manuel Ayau founded a highly profitable enterprise making ceramic tiles that enabled him to earn the wealth to support the cause of freedom that became the philosophical focus of his life. In 1959, he established the Center for Economic and Social Studies, a think tank devoted to advancing the case for free enterprise in his native Guatemala, as well as Latin American in general.

He also served on the board of trustees of the Foundation for Economic Education in New York, and was a member of the board of trustees of the Liberty Fund of Indianapolis at the time of his death. He was also a long-time member of the Mont Pelerin Society, an association of friends of freedom organized by F. A. Hayek in the years immediately after the Second World War to push back the global rising tide of collectivism.

Dr. Ayau also actively participated in Guatemalan politics, serving as a member of his country’s Congress from 1970-1974, and ran as a candidate for the presidency of Guatemala in the 1990 elections.

He wrote widely in defense of economic and individual freedom in the Guatemalan press and in American newspapers, including in the pages of The Wall Street Journal. In 2007, he published Not a Zero-Sum Game, a short, extremely readable and outstanding book, explaining the workings of a free enterprise system, based on the benefits from mutual gains from trade arising from the creative productivity of a market-based and profit-guided system of division of labor.

An excellent public speaker -- in both Spanish and English -- Manuel Ayau became one of the most eloquent voices for free market capitalism throughout Latin America. He inspired the old and the young to have a new and deeper appreciation for a society of liberty, in which creative minds were set free, and government protected life and property rather than plundered them.

I had the privilege and honor of knowing “Muso” (as his friends called him) for almost twenty years. He epitomized the old-world Latin gentleman, always gracious, hospitable, and extremely generous with his time and knowledge. He had a sharp tongue in defense of capitalism, and did not always “suffer fools gladly.” But no matter how misguided and wrong-headed he may have considered a person’s argument, his response was always given with wit and charm, and a devastating sense of humor – but always against the ideas, and never the individual.

In 2003, my wife and I were invited to FMU to deliver a series of public lectures and presentations in a variety of classrooms over nearly two weeks. The university stands as an awe-inspiring legacy to Manuel Ayau, not only because of its academic excellence and voice for liberty in Latin America, but also because of the exquisite tastefulness of the architectural design of the school. Located not far from the center of Guatemala City, it gives the impression of idyllic tranquility in a forested valley with beautiful buildings containing state-of-the-art classrooms and technology, and an excellent library.

Our stay was made even more enjoyable due to Muso’s and his wife’s hosting of a delightful weekend at their home in the Guatemalan countryside. The sharp mind of the practical businessman came through when he gave us a tour of one of his large ceramic tile factories not too far from his home, explaining every detail of the manufacturing and market methods that had made him so successful in the world of commerce.

But his love for liberty came through, as well, when he took us up to his private study on the grounds of his country home and showed us his immense library of books, monographs and publications on the ideas of individual freedom and the free market. As he shared his knowledge about many of the great thinkers of liberty and their writings, you saw how deeply and sincerely he was devoted to the freedom and dignity of man, and the need to fight in the eternal struggle against tyranny’s oppression of the individual human being.

Manuel Ayau was truly one of the champions of freedom in our time. All those who were privileged to know him will miss him, but we are all better people for having had that opportunity.

Thursday, July 8, 2010

Competitive Currencies Instead of the Euro Monopoly by Richard M. Ebeling

A new study prepared by the Dutch financial institution, ING, called “Quantifying the Unthinkable,” has warned that a collapse of the Euro as the European single currency would lead to a global economy cataclysm. The worldwide banking system would face a new and far more disastrous crisis than the one experienced during the last two years. A real economic depression would threaten the planet.


If Europe is facing such a catastrophe it must not be forgotten that it is the making of the governments and the monetary central planners who imposed the Euro on the people of Europe. And like Dr. Frankenstein, they are now terrified of the consequences of the monster they have created.


It is important to remember that the Euro is not a market-generated institution. It is a political creation inspired by the French and German governments in opposition to the desires and choices of their own citizens. Public votes on the implementation of the Euro were avoided like the plague, and in those countries where the people had a say, the answer was often a resounding, “No.” Only “outside” political pressures and fears drove more countries into the Euro-Zone, when in fact economic integration and prosperity were all possible without a monopoly currency over the continent.


The political elites in Europe, and especially in France, wanted a European-wide currency as a means to have global power against the financial and political dominance of the United States in the post-Soviet era. It was viewed as a tool in the “great game” of international diplomacy and strategic influence. All the references to the “transaction costs” saving from a single currency stretching from the Atlantic to the borders of Russia were secondary propaganda to the wider political goals: a United States of Europe centrally controlled and regulated from Brussels, with special influence on its policies emanating from Paris and Berlin.


But even from the narrower economic perspective, all the rationales for a single currency issued and managed by a European central bank were examples of what Austrian economist and Nobel Laureate, Friedrich A. Hayek, once called the “pretense of knowledge.”


We need to remember that central banking is a form of central planning. A central bank possesses monopoly control of the money supply. It determines the quantity of money in circulation and therefore influences the value, or purchasing power, of the monetary unit. It can also influence (at least in the short run) some market rates of interest, which can affect the amount and direction of investment.


Throughout the twentieth century, governments again and again have used their central banks to finance budget deficits through money creation—and have continued to do so in the 21st century. The end-products of such monetary mischief have been prolonged periods of price inflation, which eat away at people’s accumulated wealth; distort market prices resulting in imbalances between savings and investment, and supply and demand; and create disincentives for long-term business planning and capital formation.


Thirty-five years ago, Hayek warned of the dangers from European-wide monopoly money, and made the case for competitive currencies among which the citizenry may freely choose (See, F. A. Hayek, Choice in Currency: A Way to Stop Inflation, published by the London-based Institute of Economic Affairs in 1975).


Hayek explained that due to the influence of Keynesian economics over monetary and macroeconomic policy, governments were invariably guided by short-run goals in the service of special interest groups. The consequence was the constant abuse of the printing press, with its resulting price inflation, to feed the seemingly insatiable demands of those privileged and politically influential groups.


Hayek concluded that some method had to be found to free ordinary citizens from the government’s monopoly control over the medium of exchange. The answer, he suggested, is to allow them to use whatever money they choose. Hayek said:


There could be no more effective check against the abuse of money by the government than if people were free to refuse any money they distrusted and to prefer money in which they had confidence. Nor could there be a stronger inducement to governments to ensure the stability of their money than the knowledge that, so long as they kept the supply below the demand for it, that demand would tend to grow. Therefore, let us deprive governments (or their monetary authorities) of all power to protect their money against competition: if they can no longer conceal that their money is becoming bad, they will have to restrict the issue.


Make it merely legal and people will be very quick indeed to refuse to use the national currency once it depreciates noticeably, and they will make their dealings in a currency they trust.


The upshot would probably be that the currencies of those countries trusted to pursue a responsible monetary policy would tend to displace gradually those of a less reliable character. The reputation of financial righteousness would become a jealously guarded asset of all issuers of money, since they would know that even the slightest deviation from the path of honesty would reduce the demand for their product.


Governments remain today, as much as when Hayek spoke these words, under the sway of political ideologies that insist it is the duty of the state to regulate the market in the service of powerful special-interest groups, to redistribute wealth, and to secure “safety nets” under most aspects of everyday life. The budgets and deficits of many EU countries, and the fiscal crisis they have now gotten themselves into demonstrate this beyond any doubt.


The Euro’s monetary central planners still presume to have the wisdom and ability to target rates of price inflation and move interest rates in directions they consider “optimal.” I would suggest that just as the central planners in the old Soviet Union were not wise or informed enough to successfully plan the supply of shoes and the production of bread, the managers of the European Central Bank cannot know what interest rates should be or what target to set for the general level of prices. Interest rates should be set by the market to bring the actual supply of savings into balance with the demand for loans. Both the general level and the relative structure of prices should be determined by those same market forces, that is, people’s willingness to trade money for goods and goods for money.


It is said that the Chinese word for “crisis” means both “danger” and “opportunity.” It is certainly the case that the fiscal irresponsibility of most of the European Union governments has put the economic and financial structures of their countries in grave danger. But hoping that the European Central Bank can set it all right – or to delay the inevitable until some “someday” when “something” will provide a way out without the consequences of decades of fiscal mismanagement – will only mean truly dangerous inflationary forces being set loose. Because the only way for the European Central Bank to try to “paper over” this problem is by printing a lot of paper money. And Europe has already seen several times where that leads during the last hundred years.


The “opportunity” from this crisis is to admit and accept that the Euro plan was a wrong idea. It is necessary for the member governments in the Euro-Zone to begin a new plan for an “orderly retreat” back to national currencies. This is not the first time that a single currency has had to be dissolved into separate national currencies. This happened in 1919, following the disintegration of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire in Central Europe; or more recently with the collapse in 1991 of the Soviet Union into fifteen independent republics, or the splitting of Czechoslovakia into two separate countries, or the breakup of Yugoslavia.


There are lessons to be learned from these historical cases that should be carefully studied and applied to begin and complete the process of bringing the Euro “experiment” to a close with the least pain and disruption in a financial and fiscal environment in which each of the European governments will have to get their own economic affairs in order.


Even in the short run, however difficult the transition will be, those European countries that have less of a fiscal problem to get into order will at least be able to avoid being pulled into a worst vortex by their more irresponsible fiscal neighbors, if they remained within a single currency zone.


In addition, if a new multi-currency world reemerged in Europe, it should be accompanied, as Hayek suggested, with the freedom for the citizens of all of these nations to choose which currencies they prefer to hold and use in exchange. National governments should not attempt to lock their respect citizens behind barbed-wire currency barriers and restrictions.


Market freedom in money would act as a powerful force and incentive for the individual European governments to move in a more fiscally responsible direction, if they do not want to see their own national currency dramatically depreciate relative to other monies. This would serve as an additional and important “external” discipline, as Hayek also emphasized, to try to get political elites to move their domestic policies into more stable and sustainable paths.


Or will Europe continue on its present course, and go over a fiscal and monetary cliff that it otherwise might have avoided?

Monday, July 5, 2010

The Hubris of Central Bankers and the Ghosts of Deflation Past by Richard M. Ebeling

In 2003, while the United States was at the end of another boom and bust cycle following the bursting of the "dot.com" bubble and the Y2K scare, there were many monetary central planners at the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank who were expressing fears about the danger of "deflation" and the supposed perils it could create for the economies of the United States and the Europe.

Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke at the Federal Reserve and Otmar Issing at the European Central Bank were delivering speeches claiming to explain what they meant by "deflation" and what the U.S. and European central banks could and would do to prevent any deflationary forces that might come into play.

The same fears about deflation have been frequently expressed over the last two years during the current economic crisis. But the central bankers have not expressed what they mean by deflation and what they would do if it occurred with the clarity and detail with which they explained it in 2002 and 2003.

The following is an article that I wrote at that time on "The Hubris of the Central Banker and the Ghosts of Deflation Past."

I explain the different meanings of deflation and their significance. I also critically analyze what our central bankers', including the current chairman of the Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, generally mean by deflation and why their "solutions" would make any supposed deflationary "problem" even worse.

One fact should be pointed out in terms of the current economic crisis. There has been no monetary deflation -- that is, an absolute decrease in the quantity of money and credit in the economy. Just the opposite. Since 2008, the Federal Reserve has increased the total amount of reserves in the banking system by around $1.5 trillion, mostly by buying up many of those "toxic" mortgages that were guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

This huge expansion in the potential quantity of money and credit that could flood through the financial markets and generate significant price inflation has been held off the market due to the fact that the Federal Reserve has been paying banks interest to hold those sums as unlent reserves. With key market interest rates being kept artificially low at near zero or one percent through activist Fed policy, banks have found it more profitable earn that positive rate of interest at the Federal Reserve.

But unless the Fed finds some way to drain those "excess reserves" out of the banking system, significant inflationary -- not deflationary -- forces may be at work looking to the next few years ahead.

I

Nearly 75 years after the great stock-market crash of 1929, monetary policy is still haunted by the ghost of the Great Depression. The severity of the American stock-market decline during the last three years has again awakened fears among some policymakers that the economic downturn might bring about a deflationary period of collapsing output and employment like that experienced during the early 1930s.

Prominent members of the board of governors of the Federal Reserve System, as well as a senior member of the executive board of the European Central Bank, have delivered public addresses attempting to assure the financial community that it is in the power and ability of monetary central planners to prevent a repetition of the Great Contraction of 1930–33. On November 21, 2002, Federal Reserve governor Benjamin S. Bernanke delivered his address “Deflation: Making Sure ‘It’ Doesn’t Happen Here” to the National Economists Club in Washington, D.C.

About a month later, on December 19, 2002, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan discussed the dangers of and remedies for any deflationary threat at the Economic Club of New York in an address entitled “Issues for Monetary Policy.” And on December 2, 2002, European Central Bank Executive Board member Otmar Issing evaluated “The Euro after Four Years: Is There a Risk of Deflation?” at the 16th European Finance Convention in London, England.

What is deflation? Its general connotation, of course, is something “bad.” During a period of deflation, prices in general in the economy are decreasing and this is considered to generate negative consequences in terms of falling output, rising unemployment, investment uncertainty, and broad market instability and collapse.

But before the rationales for an “activist” monetary policy to combat deflation can be judged, it is first necessary to know what can be the causes behind a general decline in prices. And it is additionally useful to clarify the role of government in past episodes of price deflation.

It is possible to distinguish at least three causal factors behind a general fall in prices. They are: supply-side deflation, price-wage rigidity deflation, and monetary deflation.

Supply-Side Deflation

A general decline in prices may accompany significant increases in output resulting from productivity increases and cost efficiencies. One of the competitive forces in the market economy is the never-ending drive of entrepreneurs to bring better and less-expensive goods and services to market to the consuming public. New technologies and cost-saving innovations introduced within business enterprises enable more goods to be manufactured and sold at lower per-unit costs. Sellers, in one sector of the economy after another, increase their supplies offered on the market, and competitive pressure results in a lowering of the prices of those goods over time to reflect their lower costs of production. The cumulative effect is that the general level of prices will have declined when measured by various statistical price indices over a period of time.

In the period between the end of the American Civil War in 1865 and 1900, the general level of prices in the United States declined by about 50 percent. While the American economy did experience short periods of economic depression during those years (mostly due to the federal government’s manipulation of the monetary standard), the nearly half-century era during America’s Industrial Revolution saw a dramatic rising standard of living even though accompanied by an expanding population.

An open, free-market system tends to foster the incentives and profitable rewards for capital investment and innovation that bring forth increasing prosperity. Greater output at falling prices provides people with higher real income as each dollar they earn now buys a larger quantity of goods and services in the marketplace. Supply-side deflation, therefore, is an indication of a growing and dynamic market system that is improving the economic conditions and opportunities of the general population.

Price-Wage Rigidity Deflation

All economic change brings with it shifts in market demand-and-supply conditions. Continuous adjustment and balance within the market requires those affected by change to adapt to the new circumstances. In a world of constant change, the demands for some goods increase while other demands decline. Innovations and technological advancements as well as changing resource availability bring with it shifts in the demand and supply of various forms of labor and capital. The information about these changes and the incentives to appropriately respond to them are provided to people in the market through changes in the structure of relative prices and wages.

Any failure of prices and wages to correctly reflect the new patterns of market supply and demand only generates distortions, imbalances, and maladjustments between the two sides of the market. Under the influence of Keynesian economics, for most of the last 70 years, the resulting unemployment and falling output due to price and wage rigidities has been called “aggregate-demand failures.”

The presumption has been that the level of total demand for goods and services in the economy in general falls short of the total supply of goods and services available for sale at prices equal to their costs of production. The problem, it is said, is not that prices and wages are “wrong” on the supply side but rather that aggregate spending is “too low” on the demand side. The policy presumption has been that government and its monetary authority must increase total demand, either through government deficit spending or the central bank’s printing money and providing it for private investment and other purposes.

The free-market economist W.H. Hutt gave a refutation to this Keynesian reasoning in his two works A Rehabilitation of Say’s Law (1974) and The Keynesian Episode (1979). Hutt argued that when the Keynesians referred to excess aggregate supply and an apparent weakness of aggregate demand to purchase that supply, they were looking through the wrong end of the telescope. There cannot be an “aggregate” excess supply unless there is a super-abundance of all resource inputs and consumer-demanded outputs, at which point there would no longer be an “economic problem” because there would no longer be scarcity. Why bother whether all are employed when the society has reached the point where it is so rich in all desired things that there is no longer any work left to be done?

What can exist is an oversupply of particular goods relative to the demand for them at the prices at which they are being offered for sale. What is preventing the buying of more of these goods is not that the aggregate demand is “too low” but rather that the particular prices for these goods are set too high, given the consumer demands for them.

In other words, the sellers of these goods or labor services are pricing themselves out of the market. As Hutt expressed it, “No one can purchase unless someone else sells.... Every act of selling and buying requires that the would-be seller price his product to permit the sale and that the would-be buyer offer a price which the seller accepts.”

It is in the unwillingness of resource owners to price their products and services at levels commensurate with consumer demand that Hutt found the cause of prolonged depressions. “Discoordination in one sector of the economy will, if there are price rigidities in other sectors, bring about those successively aggravating reactions, one decline in the flow of services inducing another,” he said. When a supplier is unwilling to lower his price or wage to induce greater sales when demand for his particular good or service turns out to be less than he had, perhaps, expected, then a part of his supply remains unsold and a portion of the labor services available for hire remains unemployed.

The loss of income due to a producer’s or worker’s maintaining his supply price too high relative to actual market demand results in a decrease in his ability to purchase the goods and services of others being offered on the market. If the suppliers of those goods and services, in turn, refuse to adjust their prices and wages downwards, given the now-lower demand for their output, then the circle of unsold products and unemployed labor starts to expand. A “cumulative contraction” of output and employment may develop in the face of such a network of relatively rigid prices and wages. As Hutt’s old teacher at the London School of Economics, Edwin Cannan, expressed the problem in 1933 during the Great Depression, “General unemployment appears when asking too much is a general phenomena.”

This problem arose in the early 1930s following an inflationary monetary policy by the Federal Reserve during most of the 1920s. What fooled many people at the time was the illusion of price-level stability through most of the 1920s. The high level of productivity increases and cost efficiencies during those years would have resulted in gently falling prices, as outputs of many goods and services were expanding. But the Federal Reserve’s expansionary policy prevented prices from falling as measured by most of the standard price indices.

This monetary expansion, however, fed an unsustainable investment boom that finally burst in 1929. The malinvestment of capital and the misallocation of resources, including labor, during the boom years required significant adjustments through various sectors of the economy to restore balance and economic growth. But numerous government economic policies prevented or delayed the necessary price and wage adjustments, causing the rising tide of increasing unemployment, falling production, business bankruptcies, and bank failures.

(For a detailed analysis of the causes and cures of the Great Depression from an "Austrian Economic" perspective in contrast to that of Keynesian Economics, see, Richard M. Ebeling, Political Economy, Public Policy, and Monetary Economics: Ludwig von Mises and the Austrian Tradition (New York: Routledge, 2010), Ch. 7: "The Austrian Economists and the Keynesian Revolution: the Great Depression and the Economics of the Short Run," pp. 203-272.)

Hutt also emphasized that since the problem is incorrect pricing of particular goods and services, or “disequilibrium,” the lowering of any such price or wage to its market-clearing level “will tend to initiate a positive ‘real multiplier’ effect — a cumulative rise in activity and real income. . ..” In other words, whenever a price or wage that is too high is lowered closer to its equilibrium or market-clearing level, suppliers of those goods and services increase their sales and potentially earn higher income. Their higher incomes from pricing their goods and services more correctly, in turn, enable them to increase their demands for other goods and services and thus start a process of expanding the circle of employment and production opportunities in the market. Market-guided pricing puts the unemployed back to work and releases the flow of demand for a growing circle of goods in the economy.

Monetary Deflation

A general decline in prices can also be brought about by a monetary deflation. A contraction in the supply of money and credit reduces the amount of money in people’s hands with which they can demand the various goods and services they wish to buy in the market. With less money to spend, there invariably results a downward pressure on prices and wages in general in the economy. If there are the kinds of price and wage rigidities discussed above, then the process of restoring balance between market supplies and demands at a required lower scale or level of prices can be prolonged and punctuated by “depressionary” unemployment and lower production.

Under central banking, monetary contractions are government-made. There have been instances when governments have intentionally contracted the money supply. The British government did so after the war with Napoleon in the early 19th century and then again after the First World War in the early 1920s. Other times it has happened as a result of the central-bank-managed fractional-reserve system, under which outstanding bank liabilities are a multiple of the actual reserves to meet all depositor obligations. In the early 1930s, bank loans went bad, depositors withdrew their funds out of fear of bank closings, and the amount of bank credit outstanding contracted as a multiple of the reserves withdrawn by depositors.

Throughout the second half of the 1990s, the Federal Reserve System maintained an expansionary monetary policy. By various measurements of the monetary aggregates, between 1995 and 2000 the supply of money and credit in the United States economy increased between 35 and 50 percent. During this same period, general consumer prices annually increased in the neighborhood of 1 to 2.5 percent. A leading explanation for the failure of prices to dramatically rise during these years was the significant increases in productivity, cost reductions, and increases in output of many goods across the economy. In other words, a replay in many ways of what was experienced in the second half of the 1920s before 1929.

But whereas there was a 30 percent decrease in the U.S. money supply between 1929 and 1933, since the stock-market decline began in 2000 the Federal Reserve has kept the monetary spigots wide open. Between 2000 and the end of 2002, the supply of money in the United States economy increased by about 18 percent, or about 9 percent a year. There is nothing in recent Fed monetary policy to suggest that there has been a decline in the supply of money and credit. If anything, the Federal Reserve has followed a high expansionary policy.

What then are Benjamin Bernanke, Alan Greenspan, and Otmar Issing concerned about? Each of them in his public address insisted that there were no signs or indications of present or immediate deflationary tendencies in either the U.S. or EU economies. They each seemed determined to assure those in the financial markets that if there were any tendencies for a deflationary process setting in, they — the monetary authorities of the United States and Europe — were ready and willing to work whatever monetary magic was needed to prevent a replay of the early 1930s.

Thus, they were soothing psychological fears, especially in a situation of already low interest rates. If nominal interest rates sank to zero percent, how could the central bank manipulate interest rates to try to stimulate private sector investment spending? Wouldn’t the central banking authority then be left with no weapons to fight a deflationary spiral, if one were to set in? How then would the economy escape from a collapse similar to that experienced in the Great Depression?

The questions, of course, imply that (a) the central bank should adopt an activist policy to influence the direction and currents of the market; (b) the central bank has the wisdom and ability to stabilize the economy; and (c) central-bank intervention and manipulation will not make the situation worse than if the market is left to find its own path back to balance and coordination.

Bernanke, Greenspan, and Issing are confident on all three points. But their believing does not make it so. Indeed, their statements and analyses of the danger of deflation show just how deeply ingrained is the hubris of the monetary central planners around the world.

II

In spite of the fact that the monetary policies of the Federal Reserve System in the United States and the European Central Bank (ECB) have been highly expansionary during the current economic downturn, central bankers at both institutions have taken the time to deliver addresses assuring their listeners that there is no need for the public to fear a return to the deflationary experiences of the early 1930s. Alan Greenspan and Benjamin Bernanke of the board of governors of the Federal Reserve Bank and Otmar Issing of the executive board of the European Central Bank have laid out their understanding of what deflation means and its consequences as well as their proposals to combat deflation if it appears.

Bernanke defined deflation as a persistent decline in the general level of prices and assigned its cause to:

"a collapse of aggregate demand — a drop in spending so severe that producers must cut prices on an ongoing basis in order to find buyers. Likewise, the economic effects of a deflationary episode, for the most part, are similar to those of any other sharp decline in aggregate spending — namely, recession, rising unemployment, and financial stress."


Greenspan added, “Although the U.S. economy has largely escaped any deflation since World War II, there are some well-founded reasons to presume that deflation is more of a threat to economic growth than is inflation.” And Issing insisted that “the ECB is concerned about risks of deflation as well as inflation.”

Lowering Interest Rates

The first piece of monetary weaponry at the disposal of the central bankers, they explained, is the tried and true method of lowering short-term interest rates by buying short-term government securities and supplying additional lending reserves to the banking system. The increased reserves at lower interest rates are meant to stimulate private-sector investment spending to generate the additional “aggregate demand” for goods and services in the economy.

But what if a deflationary process has set in and nominal interest rates have fallen to zero? How will the central bankers stimulate borrowing when there is no longer any room to lower interest rates?

Have no fear, because then the Federal Reserve can always start buying longer-term government securities with maturities extending out anywhere from 10 to 30 years. If this were still to fail to do the trick, then the Federal Reserve can coordinate its money-creation process with direct expenditure by the U.S. government by printing all the money required to cover additional government deficit spending.

As Greenspan expressed it,

"If deflation were to develop, options for an aggressive monetary response are available.
. . . The Federal Reserve has authority to purchase Treasury securities of any maturity and indeed already purchases such securities as part of its procedure to keep the overnight [interest] rate at its desired level. This authority could be used to lower interest rates on longer maturities."

And in the words of Bernanke,

"Indeed, under a fiat (that is, paper) money system, a government (in practice the central bank in cooperation with other agencies) should always be able to generate increased nominal spending and inflation, even when the short-term nominal interest rate is at zero…. The U.S. government has a technology, called a printing press (or, today, its electronic equivalent) that allows it to produce as many U.S. dollars as it wishes at essentially no cost.... We conclude that, under a paper-money system, a determined government can always generate higher spending and hence positive inflation."

Since prevention is always better than having to suffer from a cure, the central bankers emphasize that the generally accepted standard of “price stability” for monetary policy does not mean zero inflation, i.e., a stable price level as measured by various price indices. No, price stability is defined as low inflation.

Issing says that the risk of any deflation “can be substantially reduced by making sure that inflation does not fall below some safety margin — say below a threshold of 1 percent — on a sustained basis.”

Bernanke concurs that “the Fed should try to preserve a buffer zone for the inflation rate; that is, during normal times it should not try to push inflation down all the way to zero.” Instead, the Federal Reserve should have an inflation target between 1 and 3 percent a year.


Monetary Bubbles

Greenspan sees the source of many economic downturns, and any deflationary dangers that may accompany them, in the bursting of asset-price bubbles on the financial markets. The problem, in his view, is that “bubbles tend to deflate not gradually and linearly but suddenly, unpredictably, and often violently.”

Thus the “evidence of recent years, as well as the events of the late 1920s, casts doubt on the proposition that bubbles can be defused gradually.”

But where do such “bubbles” come from? It is difficult to see how they are inherent in a free-market economy that is not being fed by increases in the supply of money and credit. If there were a wave of innovations that spark an increase in investment demand, the additional demand for borrowing would push up interest rates.

That would create an incentive for some income earners in the society to decrease their consumption spending and increase their savings to take advantage of the higher rate of interest.

Any direct purchase of equity shares of possibly more profitable enterprises available on the stock exchange also would have to be financed either through a decline in consumption or a decrease in bond purchases. Either way, there are no inflationary pressures, because the increase in one type of expenditure must be matched with a decrease in some other kinds, given no change in the total supply of money in the economy.

Of course, when there is investment in new products and technologies, there is always the possibility and danger of over-optimism about the cost-efficiencies being introduced or the degree of future consumer demand before the new product is actually marketed to the buying public. But even if there are losses suffered, due to a decline in the share prices of the companies applying the new technologies or marketing the new products, there would be share prices of other companies that would now be more attractive to purchase, given the actual pattern of consumer demand.

The only way that asset prices on the financial markets can be significantly rising while consumer goods and other prices do not decline, or even rise as well, is for the total quantity of money and credit available in the economy to have been increased. Then people would have enough money to maintain both their levels and patterns of spending and have the additional means to increase their demand for equity shares or bonds. If there is a financial and speculative “bubble,” it is due to the central banks providing the monetary means to feed it. Thus, the very financial bubble that has so worried Greenspan and other central bankers is the result of the expansionary policies of their own central banks.

Monetary Policy and Recession

If either the Federal Reserve or the European Central Bank pursues as its policy goal a rate of monetary expansion sufficient to keep prices from falling over time in a growing economy, or even if they pursue a policy of low inflation, they are likely to set the stage for the very type of economic downturn that they are so determined to prevent.

As Austrian economist Friedrich Hayek argued long ago, in a growing economy experiencing productivity increases and cost-efficiencies, prices for goods will have to fall over time as more goods and less expensively produced goods come on the market. Given the consumer demands for those goods, the only way the larger supplies coming on the market can find willing buyers is through decreases in the prices at which they are offered to the public.

If, however, the central bank wishes to prevent this “supply-side deflation” from occurring, it can do so only by injecting additional money into the economy. In the United States the Federal Reserve increases funds by purchasing government securities (through what are known as “open-market” purchases). This, in turn, increases the supply of reserves available in the banking system for lending purposes. To attract additional borrowing, banks lower their interest rates, which often stimulates an increase in longer-term investment projects.

But the additional borrowing at the lower rate of interest now causes total investment spending to be greater than the total amount of actual savings set aside for lending purposes by income earners in the society. In fact, savings may actually decrease: at the now lower market rates of interest the attractiveness of savings decreases even while investment spending is expanding. Thus, in the name of price stability (possibly defined as “low inflation”), an imbalance is created between savings and investment in the economy.

This imbalance eventually requires corrections, with investment spending reduced and redirected to be consistent with the actual available supply of savings. When this investment “bubble” bursts, the market value of some capital investments will have to be written down or possibly even written off. Labor suppliers in some of the overextended sectors of the economy will have to be redirected into alternative employment consistent with the actual patterns of consumer demands for various goods. The same applies to the utilization and applications of many other resources and raw materials.

If capital-asset owners or resource suppliers, including workers, resist the necessary and inevitable decline in the prices and wages for their products and services in these misdirected employments, they succeed only in pricing themselves out of the market. Their incomes fall and their ability to demand other goods declines commensurately.

The demands for an array of other goods now experience a decrease, with resulting downward pressure on prices and wages in the affected sectors of the economy. If those producing the goods and supplying the labor in those sectors also resist required reductions in prices and wages, then the circle of unemployment and idle resources expands. And the pressure for prices and wages to adjust downwards only intensifies over time as the overhang of unsold goods and unemployed labor increases.

It should be clear that this type of “price-wage rigidity deflation” cannot be cured by the magic of paper-money inflation, contrary to what Bernanke and Greenspan may think. It may be true that such a monetary expansion can directly increase the demand for goods and services when financing government deficit spending. And it may be true that if the central bank has room to lower interest rates, it might stimulate some investment borrowing that might not otherwise be occurring if interest rates remained at a higher level. But this does not solve the fundamental problems of malinvestments and misallocation of labor and resources resulting from the preceding “boom” and “bubble.”

Monetary Policy and Inflation

The product demand and employment opportunities created by direct government spending clearly can be maintained only for as long as the government continues its higher level of real spending. Any decrease in the amount of deficit expenditure for the particular goods and services demanded by the government will bring about a fall in the production of those goods and a decline in the employment opportunities of the workers drawn into those activities by the initial higher level of government spending.

Likewise, central-bank stimulus of additional private-sector investment spending to create production and employment opportunities in the face of deflationary pressures merely sets the stage for a future decline in investment activity. The investment projects that may have begun are dependent for their completion and maintenance on a continuing expansion of money and credit to sustain their existence.

Thus, an unstable inflationary process is set into motion in an attempt to get around the problem of unsold products, diminished investment activity, and unemployed workers caused by the unwillingness of some to adjust their price and wage demands in a downward direction to more correctly reflect the actual conditions prevailing on the market. As Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises noted years ago,

The course of the boom is not any different because, at its inception, there are unused productive capacity, unsold stocks of goods, and unemployed workers…. The beginning of every credit expansion encounters such remnants of older, misdirected capital investments and apparently “corrects” them. In actuality, it does nothing but disturb the workings of the adjustment process.

The continuing hubris of the central banker can be seen in his failure to fully appreciate that it has been his own monetary policies that have created the unstable booms and bubbles that he complains about and criticizes. And even when he admits that central bankers have erred in the past and have produced those very consequences to which they object, he continues to believe that “next time” they will get it right.

Otmar Issing has been more open about the limitations on the powers of central banking than others of his clan. For example, in an address delivered in Paris on December 9, 2002, he discussed these problems in “Monetary Policy in a World of Uncertainty.” He admitted that central bankers (a) know little about the prevailing economic conditions in the market because of imperfect information and faulty factual data; (b) have no way of knowing what the appropriate equilibrium patterns throughout the market should be, because they have no demonstrably “correct” model of the economy and its precise interdependent relationships; and (c) cannot be sure how and in what form private-sector actors in the market will interpret and react to policies implemented by the central bank, and thus what interdependent outcomes will be forthcoming when the policies of the central bank intersect with the actions of the market participants.

At the same time, if the central banker is to have some capacity to influence the direction of market activities, Issing believes that “there are limits to the degree of transparency that central banks can realistically be expected to supply.” In other words, the central banker cannot tell the public what it plans to do or why because then the market actors might respond in ways that would more or less completely foil the central banker’s plan.

Yet Issing wants monetary “policy to be predictable in order to reduce uncertainty and volatility in financial markets.” Thus, he wants the central banker to have his cake and eat it too. The reason he wants such secretive flexibility is that “a monetary authority should lead financial markets and not ‘follow them.’”

Why? Because, he says, private traders in financial markets operate on the basis of “ludicrously short time horizons” while the central banker maintains the proper “long-term” perspective.

Here is the monetary central planner who admits his inherent inability to know enough to plan but who just cannot give up the ghost and let the multitudes of market participants find their own way in the marketplace. The lingering appeal of social engineering just remains too strong. The hubris just cannot be foresworn.

(This article originally appeared in two parts in Freedom Daily (February and March 2003), published by the Future of Freedom Foundation, Fairfax, Va.)


Friday, July 2, 2010

A Declaration of Independence Against Big Government by Richard M. Ebeling

The Declaration of Independence, signed by members of the Continental Congress on July 4, 1776, is the founding document of the American experiment in free government. What is too often forgotten is that what the Founding Fathers argued against in the Declaration was the heavy and intrusive hand of big government.

Most Americans easily recall those eloquent words with which the Founding Fathers expressed the basis of their claim for independence from Great Britain in 1776:

"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness – That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed – That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness."

But what is usually not recalled is the long list of enumerated grievances that make up most of the text of the Declaration of Independence. The Founding Fathers explained how intolerable an absolutist and highly centralized government in faraway London had become. This distant government violated the personal and civil liberties of the people living in the 13 colonies on the eastern seaboard of North America.

In addition, the king’s ministers imposed rigid and oppressive economic regulations and controls on the colonists that was part of the 18th-century system of government central planning known as mercantilism.

“The history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States,” the signers declared.

At every turn, the British Crown had concentrated political power and decision-making in its own hands, leaving the American colonists with little ability to manage their own affairs through local and state governments. Laws and rules were imposed without the consent of the governed; local laws and procedures meant to limit abusive or arbitrary government were abrogated or ignored.

The king also had attempted to manipulate the legal system by arbitrarily appointing judges that shared his power-lusting purposes or were open to being influenced to serve the monarch’s policy goals. The king’s officials unjustly placed colonists under arrest in violation of writ of habeas corpus, and sentenced them to prison without trial by jury. Colonists often were violently conscripted to serve in the king’s armed forces and made to fight in foreign wars.

A financially burdensome standing army was imposed on the colonists without the consent of the local legislatures. Soldiers often were quartered among the homes of the colonists without their approval or permission.

In addition, the authors of the Declaration stated, the king fostered civil unrest by creating tensions and conflicts among the different ethnic groups in his colonial domain. (The English settlers and the Native American Indian tribes.)

But what was at the heart of many of their complaints and grievances against King George III were the economic controls that limited their freedom and the taxes imposed that confiscated their wealth and honestly earned income.

The fundamental premise behind the mercantilist planning system was the idea that it was the duty and responsibility of the government to manage and direct the economic affairs of society. The British Crown shackled the commercial activities of the colonists with a spider’s web of regulations and restrictions. The British government told them what they could produce, and dictated the resources and the technologies that could be employed. The government prevented the free market from setting prices and wages, and manipulated what goods would be available to the colonial consumers. It dictated what goods might be imported or exported between the 13 colonies and the rest of the world, thus preventing the colonists from benefiting from the gains that could have been theirs under free trade.

Everywhere, the king appointed various “czars” who were to control and command much of the people’s daily affairs of earning a living. Layer after layer of new bureaucracies were imposed over every facet of life. “He has erected a multitude of New Offices, and sent hither swarms of Officers to harass our people, and eat out their substance,” the Founding Fathers explain.

In addition, the king and his government imposed taxes upon the colonists without their consent. Their income was taxed to finance expensive and growing projects that the king wanted and that he thought was good for the people, whether the people themselves wanted them or not.

The 1760s and early 1770s saw a series of royal taxes that burdened the American colonists and aroused their ire: the Sugar Act of 1764, the Stamp Act of 1765, the Townsend Acts of 1767, the Tea Act of 1773 (which resulted in the Boston Tea Party), and a wide variety of other fiscal impositions.

The American colonists often were extremely creative at avoiding and evading the Crown’s regulations and taxes through smuggling and bribery (Paul Revere smuggled Boston pewter into the West Indies in exchange for contraband molasses.)

The British government’s response to the American colonists’ “civil disobedience” against their regulations and taxes was harsh. The king’s army and navy killed civilians and wantonly ruined people’s private property. “He has plundered our seas, ravaged our Coasts, burnt our towns, and destroyed the lives of our people,” the Declaration laments.

After enumerating these and other complaints, the Founding Fathers said in the Declaration:

"In every stage of these Oppressions We have Petitioned for Redress in the most humble terms: Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated injury. A Prince whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a Tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free people."

Thus, the momentous step was taken to declare their independence from the British Crown. The signers of the Declaration then did “mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor,” in their common cause of establishing a free government and the individual liberty of the, then, three million occupants of those original 13 colonies.

Never before in history had a people declared and then established a government based on the principles of the individual’s right to his life, liberty, and property. Never before was a society founded on the ideal of economic freedom, under which free men may peacefully produce and exchange with each other on the terms they find mutually beneficial without the stranglehold of regulating and planning government.

Never before had a people made clear that self-government meant not only the right of electing those who would hold political office and pass the laws of the land, but also meant that each human being had the right to be self-governing over his own life. Indeed, in those inspiring words in the Declaration, the Founding Fathers were insisting that each man should be considered as owning himself, and not be viewed as the property of the state to be manipulated by either king or Parliament.

It is worth remembering, therefore, that what we are celebrating every July 4 is the idea and the ideal of each human being’s right to his life and liberty, and his freedom to pursue happiness in his own way, without paternalistic and plundering government getting in his way.